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THE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY-REBUTTABLE OR CONCLUSIVE
Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 755, 472 P.2d 321 (1970)
Plaintiff received a divorce decree from her defendant husband on
May 2, 1967, having testified at the divorce hearing that no child was
born of the marriage.' A child was born to the plaintiff on October 26,
1967, and thereafter she filed a motion to amend and modify the divorce
decree to include a provision for child support payments of $50 a month
and payment of her attorney's fee.2 The trial court ordered the original
divorce decree to be amended to include the child support and attorney
fee payments. The lower court reasoned that the child was conceived
during the marriage and regardless of access of other parties to the
plaintiff, "the law appears to be that the husband cannot disclaim
paternity."13 The trial court determined the law to be that any child
conceived during marriage is conclusively presumed to be the child of the
husband. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho
arguing that the presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive but can be
controverted. He alleged that he and his wife had been separated since
November 1966, that the child was conceived between the dates of
February I and February 10, 1967, and that the mother had carried on
an adulterous relationship from the time of the separation until March,
1967. He further alleged that this evidence of non-access coupled with
the adulterous relationship was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy. Held: The presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable. The case
was remanded for a new trial to determine whether the evidence of non-
access was sufficient to rebut the presumption successfully.'
This case was one of first impression in Idaho, for the court had to
determine the effect of the presumption of legitimacy on a child
conceived during wedlock. s Previous Idaho cases had only discussed the
1. Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 755, 756,472 P.2d 321, 322 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 757, 472 P.2d at 323.
4. Id. at 761,472 P.2d at 327.
5. Id. at 759,472 P.2d at 325. "Legitimacy" and "paternity" may be synonymous as far as their
effect is concerned. When the child of married parents is involved, the proof of one of these facts
automatically establishes the other. The question of paternity is distinct from that of legitimacy
where an attempt is made to establish that the father of a child is one other than the husband, or
where no marriage exists. Walker, Legitimacy and Paternity, 14 ARK. L. REv. 55 (1959-60). It
might also be stated here, that when authorities use the word "presumption" they are speaking of
an inferential relation between one fact or group of facts and another fact or group of facts. The one
may for convenience be called the basic fact and the other the presumed fact. Morgan, Further
Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943). For further information on
presumptions and what is needed to overcome them see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); McCormick,
Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C. L. REV. 291 (1927).
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presumption of paternity with respect to the legitimacy of the marriage.6
The court in Alber commenced its discussion of the presumption by
reviewing the common law doctrine and its alterations through time.
At common law, legitimacy was a rule of substantive law rather than
presumption that "he is the father whom the marriage indicates" and
"every child conceived in wedlock is legitimate." '7 As time elapsed, two
exceptions to the conclusive presumption of legitimacy arose: impotency
and physical absence for a period before birth so as to make it a natural
impossibility that the husband could have been the father.' The trend in
the United States today is away from the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy,' and courts agree that the presumption will fall when
"common sense and reason are outraged by holding that it abides."10
The problem which the court in Alber on remand must confront is
determine the amount of evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.
The courts are not in agreement as to the type of evidence and the degree
of proof required to rebut the presumption successfully." Some courts
have followed the English rule requiring conclusive evidence in order to
rebut the presumption.' 2 Lee v. Stix13 held that in the case of a married
6. Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 756, 759,472 P.2d 321, 325 (1970).
7. Annot., 7 A.L.R. 329 (1920). For an absurdity reached as a result of this conclusive
presumption see 2 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-99 (2d ed.
1898). Herein is the story of St. Hugh of Lincoln who was away for 3 years and when he returned he
discovered his wife had given birth to a child the day before his arrival. The court held the child was
the legitimate child of St. Hugh.
8. Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and its
Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 437, 438 (1962); see Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2
Strange 925, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (1732); Fridman, The Presumption of Legitimacy,26 SOL. 293
(1959); Note, Presumption of Legitimacy of a Child Born in Wedlock, 33 HARV. L. REV. 306
(1919); Note, Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy not Overcome by Negative Results of Blood
Tests, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 104, 107 (1960); Note, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy
for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859, 864 (1966); Comment, The Presumption of
Legitimacy as Affected by Standing. Antenuptial Conception, and the Lord Mansfield Rule, 24 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 414,416 (1970); 37 N.D. L. REV. 110 (1961); 24 U. PiTr. L. REV. 653, 657 (1963)..
9. Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and its
Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. Rav. 437, 439 (1962). For the jurisdictions which
hold the presumption is rebuttable see Kolwalski v. Wojtkowski, 19 N.J. 247, 266, 116 A.2d 6, 17
(1955).
10. Inre Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1,5, 170 N.E. 471,473 (1930).
I1. 37 N.D.L. REv. 110 (1961).
12. Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones, (1951) A.C. 391. This case made it clear that only proof of
illegitimacy beyond a reasonable doubt would suffice to show that the child was not legitimate. For
further discussion of the presumption in England see Cretney, Somebody Else's Child, 113 SOL. J. 4
(1969); Fridman, The Presumption of Legitimacy, 26 SOL. 293 (1959); Lasack, Towards Reform of
the Law of Illegitimacy, 113 L.J. 478 (1963); Note, Law Commission and Proof of Paternity in
Civil Proceedings, Ill SOL. J. 650 (1967); Comment, The Putative Father and the Illegitimate
Child, 25 MODERN L. Rav. 736 (1962).
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woman, "proof of an adulterous relationship is insufficient to establish
paternity unless by equally clear, convincing and entirely satisfactory
proof she negates access by her husband."" The court in JD v. MD5
also required clear and convincing proof but labeled this requirement as
"substantial evidence."'" On the other hand, the requirement proposed
in State v. Brown17 was that "substantial evidence" will rebut the
presumption, but the court set forth no guidelines as to the definition of
"substantial."1 8 It has been stated that mere preponderance of the
evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy in the
majority of jurisdictions. 9 It can be seen that the degree of proof differs
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and that terminology adds even greater
confusion in this area.
The Alber court makes it quite clear what degree of proof is required
on remand when it states: "As a court of appellate review, we are unable
to say whether the appellant herein established by clear and convincing
evidence his non-access during the time of the conception of the child." 2
Consequeintly, the defendant will have to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he had no access to the plaintiff. Implicit in the statement
is that the court must recognize non-access as a means of rebutting the
-presumption of legitimacy.
The common law exceptions of impotency and absence during the
period of conception are recognized by every state, but evidence of facts
outside of these two exceptions is where the conflict over relevance or
admissibility, or both, begins. In addition to the common law
exceptions, evidence of non-access, sterility, physical appearance,
abnormal periods of gestation, and blood tests have frequently been
allowed to controvert the presumption. 21 These five types of evidence
13. 55 Misc. 2d 940, 286 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1968).
14. Id. at 989. Accord, Miller v. Robertson, 258 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970); In re Findlay,
253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); Matter of Black v. Brown, 27 A.D. 2d 683, 276 N.Y.S.2d 361
(1967); People v. Lewis, 25 A.D. 2d 567, 267 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1966); Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y.
451 (1883); Cairgle v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439
(195 1); Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beau 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (1846).
15. 453 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1970).
16. Id. at 663. Here the court stated that to amount to "substantial" the evidence must amount
to clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that no copulation occurred or was possible between
husband and wife.
17. 446 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
18. Id. at 500.
19. Stone v. Stone, 76 Wash. 2d 586,458 P.2d 183 (1969).
20. Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 755, 761, 472 P.2d 321, 327 (1970).
21. Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and Its
Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 437,439 (1962).
[Vol. 1971:492
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provide a rational basis for finding non-paternity. The absurdity arises
in the courts' utilization of this evidence, which will become apparent in
a discussion below.
The origin of the non-access rule stems from an opinion by Lord
Mansfield2 in Goodright v. Moss:23
As to time of birth, the father and mother are the most proper witnesses to
prove it. But it is a rule, founded in decency, morality and policy that they
shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they had no connection
and therefore that the offspring is spurious.24
In Barnett v. Barnett the court strictly applied the rule, holding that
because neither the husband nor the wife could testify as to the non-
access reflected in the hospital records, neither could the doctor testify
that the child was a bastard. 26 The present trend seems to be reflected in
Cairgle v. American & Standard Sanitary Corp. which allows the
presumption of legitimacy to be rebutted by evidence of non-access,
* . which is clear, convincing, direct and unanswerable," even though
the possibility of access is not entirely excluded.2 8 The standard set forth
in Cairgle is that not only is evidence of non-access admissable, but that
there is no need for absolute certainty. In accordance with this ruling, the
court in Fitzsimmons v. DeCicco2 1 held that a married woman's
testimony of non-access to her husband for fourteen years was
competent evidence in a paternity suit against a man with whom she had
been sleeping for two years prior to the birth of her baby.
The Mansfield rule has been accepted in many jurisdictions
throughout the years, because it is one means of preventing a finding of
illegitimacy.3 Yet, the status of the bastard has improved in the past two
centuries so that the rationale utilized to justify the rule is questionable. 31
22. 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 129, 130 (1970).
23. 2 Comp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
24. Id. at 593, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1258.
25. 451 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
26. Id. at 941. There is no doubt that the court in Alber does allow both spouses to testify as to
non-access.
27. 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951).
28. 24 U. Ptrr. L. REv. 653, 657 (1963). Accord, State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 399 P.2d 116
(1965); Hartford Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Prince, 28 Conn. Sup. 348, 261 A.2d 287 (1968);
Miller v. Robertson, 258 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970); Lee v. Stix, 55 Misc.2d 940, 286
N.Y.S.2d 987 (1968); Barnett v. Barnett, 451 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1970).
29. 44 Misc.2d 307, 253 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1964).
30. Comment, Illegitimacy-Two State Supreme Courts Divide Upon Admissability of
Spouses' Testimony as to Non-Access, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 615 (1964).
31. Comment, Domestic Relations-Evidence Presumption of Legitimacy, 9 DuQuEsNE L. REV.
129, 133 (1970). For further discussion see Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 299, 254 A.2d 306, 309
Vol. 1971:492]
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Evidence of sterility is another means of rebutting the presumption
which has been accepted by some courts. In Hughes v. Hughes32 it was
clear that the husband was sterile at the time of conception, and even
though he had intercourse with his wife during this time, he was
adjudicated not to be the father. In Department of Public Welfare of
City of New York v. Hamilton,3 the court stated:
In our opinion the trial court should have granted an adjournment upon
the statement of defense counsel that he had additional medical testimony
to prove that defendant was sterile in March, 1951, the alleged time of
conception. The undisputed expert testimony established that the
defendant was sterile in February, 1953.1
For the court to ignore medical evidence of sterility at the time of
conception seems unjustifiable.3
Some courts have allowed the child to be displayed before the jury to
aid in rebutting the presumption of legitimacy. The jury can therefore
determine whether the child possesses certain characteristics of the
alleged father or even whether the child is of a different race from the
alleged father. Wigmore has stated:
The sound rule is to admit the fact of similarity of specific traits, however
presented, provided the child is in the opinion of the trial court, old enough
to possess settled features or other corporeal indications."
(1969) in which the court stated, "that the rule proscribing a husband and wife from testifying as to
non-access is an anachronism and that the time for completely abandoning this rule has arrived."
Bell, Competency of a Husband and Wife to Testify as to Non-Access, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 217 (1947);
24 U. PITT. L. REv. 653 (1963).
32. 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954). For further discussion of the case see Note,
"Exception" to the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 185 (1955).
33. 282 App. Div. 1025, 126 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1953).
34. Id. at 241. Accord, Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal.2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948); Potasz v. Potasz, 69
Cal. App.2d 20, 155 P.2d 895 (1945); Crepald v. Wagner, 132 So.2d 222 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961);
Hogeboom v. Hurlburt, 207 Misc. 997, 141 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1955).
35. Schatkin, The Defense of Sterility in Paternity Cases, 59 W. VA. L. Rav. 258,265 (1957); for
further discussion see R. HOTCHKISS, INFERTILITY IN MEN 29-42 (1952); A. WEISMIAN,
SPERMATOZOA AND STERILITY 59-98 (1941); Walker, Legitimacy and Paternity, 14 ARK. L. REV, 55
(1959-60); Note, Evidence-Paternity-Sterility Test, 36 TUL. L. REV. 347 (1962).
36. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 166, at 627 (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
Accord, In Re Stone's Estate v. Heller, 77 Idaho 63, 286 P.2d 329 (1955); Salyers v.
Commonwealth, 255 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Finley v. Rowell, 243 Miss. 455, 138 So.2d
489 (1962); State v. Johnson, 351 Mo. 214, 234 S.W.2d 219 (1950); State v. Bryant, 361 Mo. 318,
234 S.W.2d 584 (1950); State ex rel. Sievert v. Merrigan, 73 S.D. 582, 46 N.W.2d 909 (1951); State
ex rel. Larson v. Benson, 46 S.D. 565, 195 N.W. 437 (1923); State ex rel. Berge v. Patterson, 18
S.D. 251, 100 N.W. 162 (1904).
Washington University Open Scholarship
PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
It has been held in Peters v. Campbell37 that a child of seventeen months
had sufficiently matured so that the physical similarities between the
child and the alleged father could be appraised. Clark v. Bradstreet
38
held that the age of the child is irrelevant, but it would seem that this
view would be sounder if applied to only those cases of miscegenation.
39
Wigmore is in agreement with this position.
A physiological principle. . . tells us that the progeny of persons of one
race receive from the progenitors certain corporal traits very different
from the traits transmitted from a progenitor of another race. The
presence of these peculiar traits of the race is therefore evidential to show a
progenitor of the race bearing those traits. The admissibility of this
evidence has never been doubted by Courts; though its use, since the
abolition of slavery in this country, is now very rare, because the issues in
which it is relevant can only be uncommon. 0
Courts have held that the husband is not the father even though he had
intercourse with his wife during the normal period of conception in those
cases where the husband and wife are of the same race and the child is of
mixed blood.4
The length of the period of gestation is also a method of rebutting the
presumption allowed by some courts. The normal period of gestation set
by the medical profession is 280 days, but the period can vary from 220-
330 days for a full-term baby. 2 Thus an abnormal period of gestation,
for example 190 days, would seem sufficient to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy.43
In Smith v. Wise44 the father argued for the adoption of the period of
gestation set by the medical profession as being 280 days, but the court
held that the fact that birth occurred 283 days after the divorce was
37. 80 Wyo. 492, 345 P.2d 234 (1959).
38. 80 Me. 454, 15 A. 56 (1888).
39. See note 37 supra at 240.
40. WIGMORE § 167.
41. U.S.v. Hung Chang, 134 F. 19, 23 (6th Cir. 1904); Bullock v. Knox, 96 Ala. 195, 11 So. 339
(1892); Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451 (1852); Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige (N.Y.) 139,
23 Am. Dec. 778 (1832); Watkins v. Carlton, 10 Leigh (Va.) 560 (1840).
42. Note, Evidence: Disputable Presumption of Parentage in California, I I HASTINGS L.J. 200,
201 (1959). Accord, Smith v. Wise, 234 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Rasco v. Rasco, 447
S.W.2d 10, 17 (City Ct. App. Ky. 1969); Comment, Presumption of Legitimacy and Related
Problems, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 538, 539 (1950).
43. In Re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919); Murr v. Murr, 87 Cal. App. 2d
511, 197 P.2d 369, 371 (1948).
44. 234 So.2d 145 (1970). Accord, Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10 (Ct. App. Ky. 1969).
Vol. 1971:492]
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insufficient alone to determine that conception did not occur until after
the divorce. The child was concluded to be the legitimate child of the
marriage.45
The most controversial and yet seemingly the most reliable evidence of
non-paternity is the blood test.4" The European courts recognized the
evidentiary value of blood tests as early as 1924, 7 but no court in the
United States had accepted the evidentiary value and accuracy of the
tests until State v. Damm 48 in which the court stated in dicta:
. . . it is our -considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test is
definitely and indeed unanimously established as a matter of expert
scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and we think the
time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such tests, made by
competent persons and properly offered in evidence, should be deemed
admissable in the court of justice whenever paternity is in issue.4"
Today, most courts do accept blood tests as evidence of non-paternity,
but the weight given to such evidence varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. It must be stated that blood tests are used as negative
evidence and nothing is proven if the blood groupings indicate that the
alleged father might be the true father of the child.5" Initial opposition to
the use of blood tests as evidence of non-paternity raised such arguments
as (I) the test was scientifically inaccurate and therefore not accepted by
45. Id. at 147.
46. For the history and general discussion of the blood-groups see L. SNYDER, THE PRINCIPLES
OF HEREDITY (1951); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 178 (1st ed. 1954); WIGNORE § 165(b); Britt,
Blood Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag", 21 MINN. L. REV. 671 (1937);
Galton, Blood Grouping Tests and Their Relationship To The Law, 17 ORE. L. REV. 177 (1938);
Ratimorszky, Blood Tests in Paternity Cases, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 491 (1970); Whitlack &
Marsters, Contribution of Blood Tests in 734 Disputed Paternity Cases: Acceptance by the Law of
Blood Tests as Scientific Evidence, 14 WEST RES. L. REv. 115, 120 (1962); Note, Children Born in
Wedlock: Blood Tests and the Presumption of Legitimacy in Missouri, 39 U.M. K.C. L. REV. 121,
126 (1970); Comment, The "'Gap" Between the Law of Paternity and the Science of Serology:
Blood Tests in Non-Paternity Proceedings, 16 MERCER L. REV. 306 (1964).
47. State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667, 669 (1936).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 312, 266 N.W. at 668. For further discussion of State v. Damm see Maguire, A Survey
of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American Law of Evidence, 16 S. CAL. L. REV.
161 (1943).
50. Walker, Legitimacy and Paternity, 14 ARK. L. REV. 55, 58 (1959-60); Accord, Britt, Blood-
Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problems of "Cultural Lag", 21 MINN, L. REV. 671 (1937);
Cretney, Blood Test, 118 NEw L.J. 1020 (1958); Waters, Blood Test and the Presumption of
Legitimacy, 118 NEw L.J. 77 (1968); Whitlach & Marsters, Contribution of Blood Tests in 734
Disputed Paternity Cases: Acceptance By the Law of Blood Tests as Scienti/ic Evidence, 14 WEST.
RES. L. REV. 115, 120 (1962); Comment, The "Gap" Between the Law of Paternity and the Science
of Serology: Blood Tests in Non-Paternity Proceedings, 16 MERCER L. REV. 306, 311 (1954).
[Vol. 1971!:492
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the scientific world, (2) the test was negative in force and application,
and (3) there was an insufficient number of cases of proof of non-
paternity by blood tests.51 Technological advances have controverted
these arguments successfully. The accuracy of the ABO group has
proven to be 99.99 per cent. 52 Because of the recognition of this validity,
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity was drafted by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which makes the blood tests
conclusive evidence of non-paternity.5 A few states have adopted it in
modified versions.
Even in those states which make the blood test conclusive,5 4
complexities still arise as evidenced in California. In Kusior v. Silversl
the court held that the presumption of paternity is not rebuttable if
husband and wife cohabited, but is rebuttable if the husband only had
access. The blood test would conclusively rebut the presumption if the
husband only had access. The decision in Kusior v. Silver revolved
around the definition of cohabiting as used in the state statute which
reads:
Not withstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is undisputably
presumed to be legitimate."
Seven years after the Kusior case was decided, the Supreme Court of
California ruled on Jackson v. Jackson.5 7 The court here held that:
51. Britt, Blood-Grouping Test and the Law: The Problems of "Cultural Lag", 21 MINN. L.
REv. 671 (1937).
52. Ratimorszky, Blood Tests in Paternity Cases, 19 CLv. ST. L. REv. 491, 500 (1970). For
further discussion on the accuracy of blood tests see Brooks, Evidence, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 390
(1960); Whitlach & Marsters Contribution of Blood Tests in 734 Disputed Paternity Cases:
Acceptance by the Law of Blood Tests as Scientific Evidence, 14 WEST. Rs. L. REv. 115, 125;
Note, Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy Not Overcome by Negative Results of Blood Tests,
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 104 (1960). In order for the court to recognize the validity of the blood test, the
court must be shown that the blood test was made by an expert and that the procedure was carried
out as carefully as possible.
53. Comment, The "Gap" Between the Law of Paternity and the Science of Serology: Blood
Tests in Non Paternity Proceedings, 16 MERCER L. REV. 306, 310 (1954). For more discussion of
the act see Ratimorszky, Blood Tests in Paternity Cases, 19 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 491,501 (1970).
54. CAL. Evidence § 895 (Deering 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1063/4 § 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.111 (Supp. 1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522.4 (1955);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. § 504 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.258 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 307.5 (Supp. 1971); UTAH STAT. ANN., § 78-25.21 (Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.23
(1957).
55. 64 Cal.2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
56. CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1962, subd. 5.
57. 67 Cal.2d 245, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
Vol. 1971:492]
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In the present case the blood tests were relevant, since they prove that
conception did not occur at various times during the four-day
cohabitation, that is, the moments when the newlyweds were engaged in
sexual intercourse5
The result in Kusior has been followed in other California cases and in
Keaton v. Keaton59 in the court stated:
Although the blood tests with other evidence were admissible on the issue
whether conception did in fact occur during cohabitation of the spouses,
when the trial court found that conception did so occur, the conclusive
presumption of legitimacy attached by virtue of section 62 1.11
In effect the California courts do not give conclusive weight to the blood
tests in cases involving section 621.11 It has been argued that conclusive
weight should be given to the results of blood tests because experts in
analyzing blood are purely objective, whereas testimony concerning
cohabitation is largely impressionistic. 62
Conclusion
The conclusive presumption of legitimacy evolved to mitigate the
strong social policy of the stigma attached to being a "bastard."63
Today, that stigma is not as detrimental legally, psychologically, and
economically to the child as it was years ago. For example, in some
states a bastard is permitted to inherit from his mother, and because of
our somewhat "freer" society, psychological effects would not be as
great as they were before. A child should not have to be concerned about
support, for in most cases the state will provide for his welfare." It would
58. 430 P.2d at 291.
59. 430 P.2d at 29 1.
59. 7 C.A. 3rd 214, 86 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1970).
60. Id. at 564. Accord, S.D.W. v. Holden, 275 C.A.2d 313, 80 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969); Jackson v.
Jackson, 27 Cal.2d 245, 430 P.2d 289 (1967), 60 Cal. Rptr. 649; Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10
(Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
61. CAL. EVID. § 621 (Deering 1967).
62. Note, Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy not Overcome by Negative Results of Blood
Tests, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 104 (1960). Accord, SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDING 197
(4th ed. 1967) in which the attorney stated "The qualified expert who reports an exclusion of
paternity, is not testifying to his opinion, but to a scientific fact of nature."
63. Johnston, Public Policy Considerations in Rulings on the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 149 (1963).
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seem in many instances that the courts are grasping at anything in order
to preserve the familial tie, and in doing so, often punishing the husband.
It must be remembered that the conclusive presumption was intended to
protect the child, but today, the emphasis seems to have shifted to
placing sanctions on the husband.
As discussed earlier, there are well-founded exceptions to the
conclusive presumption, but these exceptions lose their effectiveness
when confronted with the evidentiary burden imposed by the courts. It is
time for the courts and legislatures to bring the presumption of
legitimacy out of the dark ages. The courts are ignoring scientific facts
and realities which is no longer justifiable.
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